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WATER AND WATERCOURSES-
RECREATIONAL RIGHTS-
A DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC
STATUS OF WEST VIRGINIA STREAMS
At the turn of the century, the streams of West Virginia pro-
vided the transportation network for a flourishing lumber indus-
try.1 Despite the fading of the river drive into distant memory, the
capacity of a stream to sustain logging activity survives as the
common law test to determine the public waters of the state.2 The
classification of public waters may now be of little interest to the
lumber industry, but it is of increasing interest to those members
of the public who would wish to use these waters for recreational
pursuits.3 Since the test of public waters was designed to accom-
modate bygone commercial practices, it is ill-suited to a determi-
nation of present recreational rights. Consequently, a determina-
tion of public waters in West Virginia is a perplexing undertaking
that, in the absence of recent decisions, can yield only vague and
speculative generalizations regarding any particular stretch of
water.'
The common law classification of public and private waters
has its origins in the English courts' definition of navigability.'
Those waters within the definition of navigable waters were de-
clared to be public waters. Confusion regarding the classification
of public waters arises from the application of the term "navigable
waters" to a number of concepts that are related but not identical.,
'R. CLARKSON, TUMULT ON THE MoUrmNN 50-55 (1965).
2 See text accompanying notes 22-31 infra.
3The recreational uses of boating, swimming, fishing, wading, and even
sightseeing have received general recognition as legitimate public uses arising inci-
dent to the public's right of navigation. See, e.g., Southern Idaho Fish & Game
Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
The controversies that most frequently require a state court's determination
of the public or private status of a particular stretch of water are: (1) disputes
regarding whether title to the bed or banks or underlying minerals lies in the state
(if public) or in the riparian landowner (if private), see, e.g., Campbell Brown &
Co. v. Elkins, 141 W. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248 (1956); and (2) disputes regarding
whether the rights to boating and related recreational activity are shared by the
public or lie within exclusive riparian control, see, e.g., Mentor Harbor Yachting
Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959).
' 1 R. CLARK, WAiERs AND WATR Paroms § 37.1 (1967).
"Navigable waters" is used as the term to define those waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty. See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31 (1942). The phrase is also used in a different sense to label those waters
1
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The confusion is compounded by the early American court's mis-
taken impression that the English courts defined navigable waters,
for all purposes, as only those waters subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide.' English case law in fact reflects common English
practice and from the earliest recorded cases extends the public
right of navigation far beyond the reaches of the tidewater.8 Never-
theless, the erroneous belief in the tidewater doctrine became so
ingrained in American law that an understanding of the concept
is necessary for an understanding of the development of American
principles in effect today, for its fiction provides the reality from
which American doctrine develops.' The ultimate irony is that
American doctrine, left to itself, shed what it took to be the com-
mon law rule and "developed" into what had been English doc-
trine all along.'
In 1825, in The Thomas Jefferson, Justice Story applied the
tidewater rule as the common law test to define boundaries of
admiralty jurisdiction. In 1851 Justice Taney faced the question of
admiralty jurisdiction on Lake Ontario and found that the 1825
subject to federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. E.g., United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). It is further applied to the
substantially different category of those waters in which title to the beds belongs
to the state. E.g., Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 141 W. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248
(1956). Finally, the phrase is used for state purposes to label those waters which
are held by the state, in trust, for the use and enjoyment of the public. E.g.,
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal.
.Rptr. 830 (1976). The confusion arises since the categories, though not coextensive,
nevertheless share the same name. See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra. Clarity
can be achieved either by consistently linking the term to the purpose for which it
is being used ("navigable for admiralty purposes" or "navigable for bed title deter-
minations") or abandoning the navigability terminology altogether and labelling
different classes by terms indicating what they in fact actually are ("admiralty
waters" or "public bed waters").
For a detailed account of how the misconception arose and became estab-
lished as the presumed common law rule, see 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 23a-23e (1904).
' Id. § 23e.
A misstatement of the early rule and a list of authorities reflecting the mis-
statement may be found in 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 4 (1966). A discussion of
the error may be found in 78 Am. Jur. Waters § 60 (1975); 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 23a-23e (1904); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757 (1923).
"* Compare, for example, the discussion of the English rule in H. FARNHAM,
supra § 23e, with the "new" American rule announcecin The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
11 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). For a discussion of the actual reach of
admiralty jurisdiction at common law, see 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 9, § 22a.
2
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decision "mainly embarrasses the court.""2 The source of the em-
barrassment was largely that Justice Taney overread the Story
decision and confused the limitation on admiralty jurisdiction with
a limitation on public rights to inland lakes and streams alto-
gether.13 Thus he felt compelled to reject the tidewater test, not
just as the admiralty test, but as the federal public-waters test that
it never was, for he writes that "[i]t is evident that a definition
that would at this day limit public rivers in this country to tide-
water rivers is utterly inadmissible. We have thousands of miles
of public navigable water, including lakes and rivers in which there
is no tide."" Consequently Justice Taney, though required by the
controversy before the Court to determine only admiralty jurisdic-
tion, framed a proposition declaring all waters to be public that are
navigable in fact.
Justice Taney's characterization of public waters was subse-
quently applied in The Daniel Ball to determine whether federal
power extends under the commerce clause to the regulation of
navigation on nontidal inland waterways. The Court refined the
definition to declare that
[t]hose rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in
law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.
1
Federal decisions subsequent to The Daniel Ball have refined its
language, but its essence remains as the rule of public waters for
federal commerce clause purposes."
22 The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 ihow.) 443, 456 (1851).
23 The two concepts were distinctly separate at common law, 1 H. FARNHAM,
supra §§ 22a, 23e, and in The Thomas Jefferson Justice Story deals only with
admiralty.
" 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 457.
IS The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
" For example, in determining navigability for purposes of federal control over
the New River from Allisonia, Virginia to Hinton, West Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court applied the Daniel Ball test, construing "ordinary condition" to
refer to "volume of water, the gradients and the regularity of the flow. A waterway,
otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely
because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use before commercial
navigation may be undertaken." United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377, 407 (1940). For similar application and refinement of the Daniel Ball
definition, see United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1930); United States v. Holt
[Vol. 80
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Subsequent state court decisions reflect the language of the
federal doctrine. 7 Yet a determination of navigability for state
purposes is an altogether different matter than a determination of
navigability for federal purposes.18 As long as the state purpose
recognizes the paramount federal right to control commercial navi-
gation under the commerce clause, each state is free to determine
the property rights in its own waters by any method it chooses.'
The common law method of distinguishing public and private
rights is by defining navigability, but, as a nonliteral term of art,
navigability can mean whatever the state, for its purposes, chooses
it to mean.2"
Thus the state definitions, freed from the presumed common
law ebb-and-flow-of-the-tide restrictions, took on the character
appropriate to the particular needs of the individual state and
became as unique and varied as the conditions within the state
upon which each is based." At the time of the formulation of the
West Virginia rule, perhaps the most prevalent use of the water-
ways of the state was as "highways" for logging drives.2 Thus it is
not surprising that the controversy that led to the formulation of
the West Virginia rule concerned the right of such use, nor that the
rule that emerged contains provisions for logging privileges.?
The action was a trespass on the case. The plaintiff, Isaac
Gaston, was "possessed of a certain close" on both sides of Stone
Coal Creek in Lewis County. That portion of the creek "was not,
in its natural condition, sufficient to float vessels or other craft, but
• . .saw-logs could be floated upon the occurrence of floods."2 In
a manner consistent with private riparian ownership, Gaston
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256
U.S. 113 (1921); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
" See, e.g., Sneed v. Weber, 307 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1957); Cleveland & P.
R.R. v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 317 Pa. 395, 176 A. 7 (1935); Boerner v. McCallister,
197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
11 Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927); Hitchings v. Del
Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976).
" United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
See note 6 supra.
21 Compare, for example, the public waters test in Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va.
14, 10 S.E. 60 (1889), designed to accommodate logging activity, with MIsS. CODE
ANN. § 51-1-1 (1972), basing navigability on the capacity for floating two hundred
bales of cotton.
" See R. CLARKSON, TUmuLT ON THE MOUNTAIN 50-55 (1965).
2 Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60 (1889).
11 Id. at 16, 10 S.E. at 61.
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maintained a milldam across the creek. The impounded waters,
thus raised, provided the supply that turned the waterwheel that
powered Gaston's mill. The dam had been in existence since 1818
and until 1880 no logging activity had been attempted on the
creek. Despite the obstruction of Gaston's milldam, in 1880 the
defendant, at the appropriate high-water opportunity, deposited
his collection of sawlogs into the upstream waters. Upon reaching
Gaston's property, the logs collected in the millpond until, either
through weight or impact, the logs smashed the dam and pro-
ceeded on their way to market. Gaston brought suit to recover for
the destruction of his dam and for the loss of the use of his mill.
The West Virginia court held that not only was there no tres-
pass, but that Gaston's dam had been a public nuisance, an
"illegal and improper obstruction" of the public highway that lies
in navigable waters.2 The definition of navigability that the court
fashioned to encompass a creek incapable of floating anything
more than sawlogs at floodstage unfolds in three parts:
(1) Tidal streams, that are held navigable in law, whether
navigable in fact or not; (2) those that, although non-tidal, are
yet navigable in fact for "boats or lighters," and susceptible of
valuable use for commercial purposes; (3) those streams which,
though not navigable for boats or lighters, are floatable, or cap-
able of valuable use in bearing logs or the products of mines,
forests and tillage of the country they traverse to mills or mar-
kets.2
The first class can be recognized as the fictional "English" cate-
gory,2 which the decision proceeds to criticize as inappropriate in
an application to American waters. The second class is familiar as
a reflection of the federal commerce clause test of waters navigable
in fact. 8 Yet since the third class-the "floatable" streams or
"sawlog" category-extends the reach of public waters well beyond
that of the second class, it is apparent that the sawlog test, if given
equal consequence, is the operative one in West Virginia.
The first difficulty in an application of the sawlog test is in
determining if the West Virginia court has placed the floatable
class on an equal footing with that of waters commercially naviga-
ble in fact. The distinction the court draws between the two classes
2 Id. at 30, 10 S.E. at 66.
2 Id. at 20, 10 S.E. at 62.
2 See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
[Vol. 80
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is that the title to the beds of floatable streams remains, as with
nonnavigable waters, in private hands, whereas the beds of waters
navigable in fact are property of the state. The distinction may
mean very little as far as public use is concerned, depending upon
the following implications of bed ownership that the court has not
discussed.
Title to the beds of waters navigable in fact is held by the
state, but held in trust for the use of the public."9 Title to the beds
of floatable streams is held by the riparian, but held subject to a
public easement for navigation." The distinction bears no signifi-
cance for the public user so long as the easement is a general one
extending, like the public trust, to activities incident to the navi-
gational right: recreational boating, swimming, fishing and wad-
ing. The Gaston controversy involved only the public's right to
float sawlogs and the court's decision limits its concern to estab-
lishing that right. Litigation regarding the scope of the easement
has not reached the court.
3 1
The extent of the easement in floatable streams has been liti-
gated elsewhere. The decision of the Missouri court in Elder v.
Delcour2 warrants examination since the state law of navigable
waters upon which it is based appears to be identical to that delin-
eated by the West Virginia court in Gaston v. Mace." The Missouri
controversy involved a floatable stream deemed by Missouri law
" Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 141 W. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248 (1956).
Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60 (1889).
3, The only apparent reference the West Virginia court has ever made to the
recreational uses incident to the public right of navigation appears tangentially in
International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944). A
landowner brought a public nuisance action based on an upstream polluter's inter-
ference with the use of the Greenbrier River for fishing and bathing. The lan-
downer's claim to special injury was derived from his riparian status. The court held
that the public's right to share equally in the enjoyment of the river defeats the
riparian's claim of special injury. Without referring to navigability, or specifying
into which public class the river fell, the court stated that
anyone ... could fish in the same waters to the very edge of the river
and to the same extent as the [riparian] if such others could reach these
waters from a boat, a bridge, or by any other means .... Is the right to
bathe in the river, on which his land fronts, any greater in a riparian
owner than in the general public? All may use the waters of a river for
this purpose equally with the owner of the abutting land, so long as they
do not trespass on the land.
Id. at 893, 30 S.E.2d at 540.
364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
33 W. Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60 (1889).
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to be nonnaviiable for bed title purposes, but, like the West Vir-
ginia category, a public highway nonetheless. The Missouri plain-
tiff sought a declaratory judgment to ascertain his rights to canoe,
wade, and fish.in the floatable stream. The landowner had fenced
the farmland through which the stream flowed. Canoeing down-
stream, the plaintiff encountered the fence obstructing his way,
along with written trespass warnings that were orally reinforced by
the landowner himself. Ignoring the warnings, the canoeist pressed
the fence out of his way. While on the riparian's land, the plaintiff
fished, waded, portaged, and picnicked along the bank. The court
held that the floatable character of the stream created in it a
commercially valuable public highway. Thus, notwithstanding the
private bed and the noncommercial nature of the activity, the
canoeist had a right to the stream's use, so that his activities, while
using the stream, were free from trespass. Because Missouri and
West Virginia share the floatable concept, the decision may bear
predictive relevance to the eventual resolution in the West Virginia
courts.
The second difficulty that arises in applying the sawlog test
of public waters is that the test cannot be applied with any cer-
tainty to the miles of marginally floatable waters unless a river
drive has actually been attempted. The proof of a river's suscepti-
bility to a particular activity is the accomplishment of that activ-
ity." In the absence of an attempt, a landowner can only guess as
to the public or private status of the waters that flow through his
possessions. In the case of Isaac Gaston, sixty-two years of local
experience would suggest that his "guess" of privacy was correct.
Only in the ruins of his milldam did he learn that it was not.35
Part of this difficulty is inherent in the design of any general
test to achieve predictive reliability when applied to a specific
stretch of water. The source of the problem lies in the peculiar
nature of the river itself. Unlike the fixed and less mutable objects
of ordinary property rights, the river is a slithering, fluctuating
quantity. At its mouth it merges with the sea, as navigable and as
public as the sea itself. At its source it is innumerable insignificant
trickles, perhaps as public as all of nature might be, but certainly
not by virtue of its navigability. Yet somewhere in between the one
becomes the other and the privacy of the land on which it flows
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in privacy oppose the public's interest in the enjoyment of the
outdoors, the opposing parties will require that the line be drawn.
Yet what is navigable one day is not the next, and no matter how
detailed the test may be, the imprecision remains. To draw the line
by virtue of the susceptibility of a stream to the floating of logs in
commerce is to utilize a test whose results, in the absence of the
actual commerce, would be uncertain throughout miles of the
course of every stream in the state.
The alternatives are not necessarily preferable. Early in its
history the Texas legislature attempted to remove the uncertainty
with a statutory formula based on specified dimensions rather than
susceptibility for a particular use.36 Although the Texas width re-
quirement may provide a greater certainty, the imprecision of
applying a fixed definition to a fluctuating quantity nevertheless
remains.37 More significantly, predictability is acquired at the ex-
pense of flexibility, and it seems evident that the limits of useful
navigation would rarely coincide with the innermost reaches of
arbitrary width. The difference is that whereas the susceptibility
tests fail to label many waters, the measurement tests label them
all, but inaccurately.
The final difficulty in applying the sawlog test of public waters
is that the test is designed to protect a commercial practice that
is no longer in existence. Although the disappearance of commer-
cial practice on a particular stream does not diminish its public
status,38 it nevertheless compounds the difficulty of determining
that status. Once determined to be navigable in fact, a stream is
- TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (Vernon 1962), enacted in 1837, declares
that "[a]ll streams so far as they retain an average width of thirty feet from the
mouth up shall be considered navigable streams." Enacted, ostensibly, for survey
purposes, the statute is applied by the courts as the formula to determine the public
waters of Texas for "navigation, fishing and other lawful purposes." Diversion Lake
Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 138, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1935).
A 1972 Mississippi enactment provides an example of a considerably more
detailed attempt to approximate the limits of useful navigability:
Such portions of all natural flowing streams in this state having a
length of not less than five miles and which have an average depth along
the thread of the channel of three feet for ninety consecutive days in the
year and which have an average width at low water of not less than thirty
feet shall be public waterways of the state on which the citizens of this
state and other states shall have the right of free transport and the right
to fish and engage in water sports.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-1-4 (1972).
Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 141 W. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248 (1956).
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held to be permanently navigable, thus public, in law." The sus-
ceptibility for the activity, though, is determined by the occur-
rence of the activity. 0 The problem created by the disappearance
of actual use under the commercial-practice definitions is that no
compilation of the streams put to such use was ever recorded, and
the small-scale commerce of the past is long forgotten.
In a 1956 decision requiring a determination of the navigabil-
ity of the Guyandotte River in Lincoln County for bed title pur-
poses, the evidence of actual use was provided by available histo-
ries and by the testimony of those still able to recall such use.,, The
witnesses ranged in age from seventy-three to ninety-two years old.
The ninety-two year old died between trial and appeal. The young-
est of the witnesses, if alive today, would be ninety-five years old.
In the absence of a historical compilation, the outcome of a deter-
mination of a stream's capacity for commercial use may depend
on nothing more than the oral testimony of those who remember
that use. The ability of a litigant to procure that testimony would
be difficult today, and impossible tomorrow.
The task should not be necessary. The floatable-streams test
was designed to secure the public right to conduct the prevalent
activity of the day."2 The West Virginia streams were valuable
highways for commercial flotation, so language that provides for
public use was adapted to specifically embrace commercial flota-
tion. 3 The most frequent public uses today are undoubtedly the
recreational ones of boating, fishing, and swimming. Yet, as rights,
they arise under commercial-use definitions only incident to the
right of navigation for valuable commercial purpose." The suscep-
tibility for commercial use must be established as a condition pre-
cedent to recreational use. If the prevalent use is the use that the
law is designed to protect, then the courts could be expected to
acknowledge recreational navigation as a right in itself, indepen-
dent of the stream's susceptibility to floating sawlogs and other
products to market. 5
'Id.
Gaston v. Mace, 33 W. Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60 (1889).
Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 141 W. Va. 801, 93 S.E.2d 248 (1956).
' Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856
(1974).
See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
" See, e.g., the discussion of Elder v. Delcour in text accompanying notes 32-
33 supra.
11 It is uncertain to what extent, if any, a recreational rule would extend the
limits of public navigability. In the absence of current river logging practices, the
[Vol. 80
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The concept is not a new one. The first state to hold recrea-
tional use in itself to be sufficient to determine the public status
of a body of water was Minnesota in 1893.46 The controversy before
the Minnesota Court required a determination of the navigability
of the former waters of a dry lake bed for the purpose of establish-
ing title to the relicted land. The waters were never commercially
navigable. The court found that
[m]ost of the definitions of "navigability" in the decided cases,
while perhaps conceding that the size of the boats or vessels is
not important, and, indeed, that it is not necessary that naviga-
tion should be by boats at all, yet seem to convey the idea that
the water must be capable of some commerce of pecuniary
value, as distinguished from boating for mere pleasure. But if,
under present conditions of society, bodies of water are used for
public uses other than mere commercial navigation, in its ordi-
nary sense, we fail to see why they ought not to be held to be
public waters, or navigable waters, if the old nomenclature is
preferred. Certainly, we do not see why boating or sailing for
pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as boating
for mere pecuniary profit. 7
The rationale of the Minnesota decision was subsequently
applied in other states to the resolution of disputes between recrea-
tional users and riparians over the use of waters incapable of com-
mercial proof. 8 The majority rule within the states that have con-
fronted the issue now appears to be that the capacity for recrea-
tional navigation confers the right of recreational navigation.49 The
commercial limits under the Gaston sawlog test are unascertainable. Recreational
limits are suggested in B. BURRELL & P. DAVIDSON, WILD WATER WEST VIRGINIA (2d
ed. 1975), an account of West Virginia waters that includes the small whitewater
streams considered to be at the limits of a skilled kayaker's capabilities. Whether
such specialized navigation would constitute public use sufficient to establish pub-
lic status is yet a further matter for clarification.
11 Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
I d. at 199, 53 N.W. at 1143.
People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Kelley ex
rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974); Roberts v.
Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 202,
126 N.E.2d 444 (1955); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937);
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
4' Several states have also embodied the principle into statute. Perhaps the
most precise is IDAHO CODE § 36-1601 (1977):
Public Waters-Highways for recreation.-
(a) Navigable Streams Defined. Any stream which, in its natural
state, during normal high water ... is capable of being navigated by oar
10
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capacity of a particular stream is simply demonstrated by the
accomplishment of the act. There the fence serves, not as a warn-
ing to potential trespassers, but as a public nuisance to those it
obstructs.50
A strict application of the recreational-use definition carries
with it the potential for harsh results. The Ohio Court of Appeals
applied Ohio's recreational-use definition to a dispute between
canoeists and the owner of a concrete causeway running from the
shore to an island in order to connect two portions of the defen-
dant's industrial operation.5 ' The court affirmed an order compel-
ling the removal of the causeway. In a stream which is capable of
supporting only small canoes and kayaks perhaps riparian and
public interests could both have been accommodated by requiring
simply a provision for passage, or even more minimally, an ease-
ment providing rights of portage.2 Such an accommodation of con-
flicting interests in place of strict nuisance principles finds expres-
sion in the West Virginia court's Gaston decision in which the
court permits milldams on "sawlog" streams so long as they con-
tain sluices for sawlog traffic.
53
The smaller canoeable streams of the state are frequently ob-
structed by farmers' fences, private causeways, and low-water
bridges. 4 Lulled by his observance of years of disuse, the land-
or motor propelled small craft for pleasure or commercial purposes is
navigable.
(b) Recreational Use Authorized. Navigable rivers . . . shall be
open to public use as a public highway for travel and passage, up or
downstream, for business or pleasure, and to exercise the incidents of
navigation-boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and all recreational
purposes.
(c) Access Limited to Navigable Streams. Nothing herein con-
tained shall authorize the entering on or crossing over private land at any
point other than within the high water lines of navigable streams except
that where irrigation dams or other obstructions interfere with the navig-
ability of a stream, members of the public may remove themselves and
their boats, floats, canoes or other floating crafts from the stream and
walk or portage such crafts around said obstruction re-entering the
stream immediately below such obstruction at the nearest point where it
is safe to do so.
E.g., People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971).
5' State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336
N.E.2d 453 (1975).
12 See, e.g., Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96
Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
13 33 W. Va. at 30, 10 S.E. at 66.
4 For a discussion of these waters from a recreationist's viewpoint, see B.
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owner has felt free, for example, to fence his pasture to include
rather than exclude the streams along which it lies. It seems un-
necessary to disrupt such use of property so long as passage is
nevertheless permitted. A canoeist on a small stream is required
to evade so many natural obstacles that the occasional man-made
obstacle that serves riparian needs seems too minimal to deserve
the court's attention. 5
On the other hand, not all states in which the issue of recrea-
tional use as a right in itself has been raised have adopted formula-
tions that favor the recreational public. Arkansas permits a land-
owner to fence a riverbank to prevent public boating and swim-
ming where waters are not "commercially usable witl any degree
of tolerable regularity."5 Missouri permits obstruction of waters
not "capable of floating vessels or boats such as are used in the
customary modes of travel in pursuit of commerce."5 These ex-
pressions of commercial-use requirements are reflective of the lan-
guage of the continuing series of federal decisions regarding navig-
ability. 8 The rationale supporting the federal language, though, is
absent from state determinations. The federal definition is neces-
sarily tied to commercial use since its very purpose is to determine
those waters subject to federal regulation under the commerce
clause.59 The states' definitions serve the altogether different pur-
pose of determining local property rights."
Underlying the issue is a determination whether the state defi-
nitions are principally designed to provide for public commerce or
principally designed to provide for public use. If the West Virginia
definition of navigable waters is designed to provide for public use,
then the early formulation of its sawlog category is a prime exam-
ple of the court fulfilling its duty to insure that the law develops
to reflect the needs and values of the society it is designed to serve.
The current need for modification of the navigable waters test in
BURRELL & P. DAVIDSON, WILD WATER WEST VIRGINIA (2d ed. 1975).
53 Furthermore, to hold otherwise would force a landowner along waters of
uncertain public status to guess, like Gaston, as to the susceptibilities of the water.
Precision would be impossible, particularly since improvements in whitewater tech-
nique and equipment are currently expanding the extent of waters susceptible to
navigational sports. Id.
Jones v. Scott, 509 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ark. 1974).
'T Sneed v. Weber, 307 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo. App. 1957).
See cases cited note 18 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
'o See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
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order that present rights reflect present conditions parallels the
former need for modification of the old tidewater test that was once
presumed to be in effect. Just as the West Virginia court discarded
the tidewater definition of navigable waters in order to provide for
a more accurate reflection of what was in fact susceptible to public
use under the circumstances of the day,"1 so, it may be argued,
should the court now permit the refinement of the susceptibility
test to encompass the activities that the public does in fact exer-
cise.
In 1977, the West Virginia legislature announced, in response
to the growing cost of acquiring and maintaining recreational park
lands, that "it must establish, provide for, and maintain, limits
on state recreational facilities. 612 Thus while outdoor interests
continue to grow, there is little hope that available park facilities
will expand to accommodate those interests. The miles of natural
waterways of uncertain public status become increasingly signifi-
cant.
George Castelle
Town of Ravenswood v. Fleming, 22 W. Va. 52 (1883).
,2 W. VA. CODE § 20-1-20 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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